Abstract: Seeing one's laptop to be missing, hearing silence and smelling fresh air; these are all examples of perceptual experiences of absences. In this paper I discuss an example of absence perception in the tactual sense modality, that of tactually perceiving a tooth to be absent in one's mouth, following its extraction. Various features of the example challenge two recently-developed theories of absence perception: Farennikova's memory-perception mismatch theory and Martin and Dockic's meta-cognitive theory. I speculate that the mechanism underlying the experience is a body schema that has failed to update itself.
after-images.
1 Some of his examples are tactual: after one has removed one's hat, it may still feel present on one's head. Relatedly, in the case of phantom appendages, a body part that is literally absent continues to phenomenally linger after its amputation. The idea that one's extracted tooth is likewise an experiential 'lingerer' is a suggestive one and my positive account of the mechanism underlying the experience (see section VI) relies on the idea that the tooth is being represented as present by part of one's psychology.
Nonetheless, one should be careful not to think of the experience of objects as absent, and one should be careful not to think of Dentist in particular, as an experience of an object's after-image.
1
For one, no argument for the existence of sense-data analogous to those one finds proceeding from considerations of after-images (see, e.g., O'Shaughnessy 2000: Ch.18) could proceed from cases of absence perception. After-images are appearances of objects, e.g., hats, lights, arms, etc.
that linger in the absence of those objects. But perceptions of absence are not experiences of ghostly appearances or 'half-presences' akin to illusory experiences of pure visibilia like rainbows or shadows, as after-images are plausibly to be regarded (Phillips 2013) . Feeling the absence of a tooth in one's mouth is not to be analysed as feeling a sort of shadowy, half-present tooth (mere tactibilia, if there could be such a thing). It is an experience of a thing's not being there at all.
Before beginning, I outline my assumptions about the nature of absence perception and perception more generally. First, I assume that tactual perception has high-level content (Siegel 2006) in that it represents not only low-level properties relating to spatial extent, texture, weight, etc., but also properties relating to the kind(s) under which tactually sensed objects falls under.
For instance, running one's fingers along a table, one tactually represents the presence of a table (or perhaps wood), in addition to tactually representing the presence of variegated grooves on a relatively flat surface before one. One doesn't merely represent via touch that there is an object before one; touch takes a stand on the kind of object there. I assume that this carries over in cases of perceived absences, though matters here are delicate (see Farennikova 2013: 451-2) .
Thus, in Dentist and cases similar, one represents the absence of a tooth. Those who disagree can understand the content of one's tactual experience in Dentist along such lines as: that an object is absent. In making these assumptions, I also assume that perception does have content in that it represents the world as being some way. Tied up with the concept of representation is misrepresentation, since representations have accuracy conditions. Certainly, not everyone agrees that we should think of perception in this way (see Campbell 2002; Martin 2004 and Travis 2004) , but insofar as I must adopt some standpoint from which to investigate absence perception, the representationalist one is my choice. Many assume that questions about perception easily translate between representationalist and non-representationalist frameworks.
I make no such assumptions here (see Cavedon-Taylor 2015 for discussion). My final assumption concerns the scope of absence perception. Perceptual content has both an objectplace and a property-place. In hallucination, the accuracy conditions of the object-place are not met. In illusion, the accuracy conditions of the object-place are met, while those of the propertyplace are not. Accordingly, one can have perceptions of absences that are about the absence of certain properties and one can have perceptions of absences that are about the absence of certain objects. As should be clear from the above, my concern is with the latter.
• The sensation of missing a step while going down the stairs.
First, Farennikova (2013: 445) claims that the phenomenology of absence perception is one of incongruity. This rings true in both Laptop and Dentist. The perception of the laptop's absence and the perception of the tooth's absence both have a phenomenological 'oddness' to them. The experiences have a conscious character which might be described as one of strangeness, unfamiliarity and which are somewhat unsettling.
Second, Farennikova claims that the mechanism underlying absence perception is one of mismatch between images of objects ('object-templates') on the one hand and visual stimulus on the other. These object-templates are tokened in working-memory by the visual registering of contextual, environmental cues. These templates encode, sometimes only coarsely, the visible properties of objects. Once tokened, the template is 'projected' in order to be matched against further incoming perceptual stimuli. This projecting is described as " You are about to make coffee and discover that the coffee jar is empty; or you expect an important document in the mail but there is nothing in your mailbox; or you make a trip to a bakery only to see that your favorite desert is missing from the display. These situations, in essence, are failed visual searches: you begin to look for an object, expecting it to be at a certain place, and see its absence when your expectation is disconfirmed.
(Ibid: 440)
A very natural thought is that these are cases in which an agent consciously expects the presence of coffee, a particular document, a particular desert, etc. Thus, these examples plausibly depend upon the agent's having a personal-level expectation of an object's presence, one that is missing The meta-cognitive theorist may reply that they need not commit to a single analysis of all putative cases of absence perception: surprise is the correct analysis of some examples of absence perception, but different meta-cognitive feelings may need to be appealed to in order to explain others. The most obvious way to apply this strategy to Dentist would be to claim that all one needs to appeal to here is the perception of presences, i.e. the teeth still in one's mouth, plus a feeling of incongruity. This strategy mirrors what Martin and Dokic have to say about perceiving the empty box in case 2: one sees what is present, i.e. the inside of the box, and feels surprised.
The difficulty with this proposal is that it seems insufficient to capture the phenomenology of given that all the other boxes were seen to contain marbles. But nothing that is perceived as present in Dentist is incongruous or anomalous. What is incongruous or anomalous is what is absent! Once one acknowledges this, it is difficult to refrain from taking the further step of affirming that the phenomenology in Dentist is perceptual, insofar as it is directed towards the gap. Given that one already believes there to be a gap there, such a phenomenology is not happily analysed as an instance of purely cognitive phenomenology either. The most natural explanation is that it is perceptual phenomenology. One has a tactual experience of a tooth's absence.
VI -The Phantom Tooth
All in all, we have reason to think that Dentist is a genuinely perceptual experience of an absence, contra Martin and Dokic, but one that fails to be explained by a memory-perception mismatch mechanism. What psychological mechanism does underlie Dentist? My speculative answer is that it involves a mismatch between body schema and incoming perceptual stimulation. In short, after the removal of the tooth, one's body schema fails to update itself. The result is that it continues to represent the tooth as present. When one moves one's tongue in one's mouth, one then has a tactual experience of the interior of one's mouth that conflicts with how it is represented by one's body schema; that is, as continuing to contain the extracted tooth. An unsettling tactual experience of the tooth's absence ensues. See Turker, et. al. (2005) for experimental evidence that the body schema encodes teeth. Moreover, those who argue for the possibility of incorporating extra-bodily tools into the body schema sometimes model such incorporation on the body's representation of teeth (Holmes and Spence 2006). 3 Of course, there might be other cases of perceiving the absence of one's own body part that are explained by Farennikova's model. One might see the absence of one's middle finger, following its amputation, say. Such an experience is plausibly explained by the perception of a deviant pattern, whereas Dentist need not be.
One might wonder whether this proposal is compatible with Farennikova's model along the following lines:
4 perhaps movement of the tongue in the direction of the missing tooth cues an object-template of the tooth in working-memory precisely in virtue of the body schema having failed to update itself. On this revised proposal, bodily movement triggers the tooth-template due to the body schema's continuing to represent the presence of the tooth.
By way of replying to this revised proposal, it will be helpful to reflect on differences between representation by working-memory versus representation by the body schema. This will also serve to further highlight important differences between Dentist and Laptop.
A key difference between body schema representation and working-memory representation is that the latter tends to update itself much faster than the former in response to incoming stimuli.
(It is well-known that the body schema is relatively stable and can take significant time to update, resulting in experiences of so-called 'phantom' appendages.) Indeed, Farennikova claims that visual experience of the laptop's absence is fleeting and short-lived (Ibid: 445 n.12); it quickly dissipates into either a perceptual experience of the incoming stimulus (the presence of the desk) or collapses into visual imagery of the object-template (one's laptop). But as well as quickly dissipating, the experience in Laptop is unlikely to repeat itself; working-memory speedily updates how it represents the room in response to the incoming stimulus in such a way that one is not continually struck by the laptop's absence as one re-enters the room minutes, hours or days later. But this makes for a contrast with Dentist. First, the experience in Dentist is not fleeting and may be unsettling precisely because of its duration; one can experience the absence of the tooth for some time, as one haptically probes the void left by its extraction. Second, a few minutes, hours, mornings, etc., after the tooth's removal, one may continue to re-experience the tooth's absence in a way that one doesn't continue to re-experience the laptop's absence. Thus, considerations of duration and repeatability suggest that working-memory has little role to play in facilitating the tactual experience of absence in Dentist, whether in the way Farennikova's model suggests, or in the manner suggested by the revised view outlined above.
At the beginning of the paper, I attempted to distinguish experiences of after-images from experiences of absences. Phantom appendages, I mentioned, were thought of by Price (1932) The answer is that Dentist does not rely merely on a body schema that has failed to update itself.
Rather, it relies on a mismatch between that body schema and tactual stimulation. 5 Indeed, it is possible that subjects suffering with phantom appendages might undergo an experience similar to that in Dentist, if they haptically explore the space where they feel the phantom limb to be located. Still, assuming such a thing is possible, it would be the mismatch in tactual stimulation and body schema that would underlie this experience of the limb's absence. Crucially, it would not be a haptic sensing of a tactual after-image. So the two remain distinct.
VII -Conclusion
There is greater variety among our experiences of absence than is captured by the memoryperception mismatch and meta-cognitive theories. Attempting to unify phenomena by explaining them with a single model is a worthwhile endeavor, but by shoehorning too many cases into a single mold we risk overlooking genuine diversity. This, in turn, risks us missing out on a full and enriched understanding of the target explanandum, i.e. absence perception, and the myriad of mechanisms in the brain that might underlie it.
5
Another anonymous referee for this journal asks whether my view entails that a brain in a vat could have an experience of absence. My answer is 'yes.' One might find this result odd. For a brain in a vat, all objects are absent. So in having an absence experience, do I (and others in the debate) commit to brains in vats as having veridical experiences? Again, my answer is 'yes.' But this result is not so odd if one keeps matters of perceptual veridicality distinct from matters of perceptual contact with one's environment. On my view, the absence experiences of the brain in the vat are akin to veridical hallucination. The brain in the vat perceive objects to be absent which really are absent, hence such experiences are veridical. But the brain in the vat's absence experiences fail to involve the world itself in the relevant way that should cause us concern. For instance, qua brain in a vat, it fails to be in perceptual contact with the region of space between two teeth. This is the result we should want.
Granted, there may be other examples of tactual experiences which are explained by both the memory-perception mismatch model and the meta-cognitive theory. 6 My claim is that there is at least one such example of a tactual experience, which, due to its being (i) expected, (ii) directed towards one's own body and (iii) having certain duration and repeatability, which is not well explained by these theories.
